Results for 'Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl'

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  1. Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl and Matthew Mcgrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Intuitively, in Train Case 1, you have good enough evidence to know that the train stops in Foxboro. You are epistemically justified in believing that proposition.
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  2.  46
    Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work.Jeremy Fantl Æ Matthew McGrath - unknown
    Abstract We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is ‘‘mad,’’ that it licenses absurd claims such as (...)
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  3.  73
    On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...)
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  4. Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  5. Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  6. On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a (...)
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  7. Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough (...)
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  8. Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  9. Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  10. Truth and Epistemology.Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 127--145.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a (...)
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  11. Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  12. Radical Knowledge Minimalism.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):223-227.
    We argue that knowledge doesn‘t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism.
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  13.  70
    Contemporary epistemology: an anthology.Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2018 - Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
    A rigorous, authoritative new anthology which brings together some of the most significant contemporary scholarship on the theory of knowledge Carefully-calibrated and judiciously-curated, this strong and contemporary new anthology builds upon Epistemology: An Anthology, Second Edition (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) by drawing a concise and well-balanced selection of higher-level readings from a large, diverse, and evolving body of research. Includes 17 readings that represent a broad and vital part of contemporary epistemology, including articles by female philosophers and emerging thought leaders Organized (...)
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  14. Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  15. Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  16.  89
    Epistemology: An Anthology.Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (eds.) - 2008 - Wiley.
    New and thoroughly updated, Epistemology: An Anthology continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  17. Knowledge in an uncertain world * by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath[REVIEW]Kenneth Boyd - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):189-191.
    A review of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath's "Knowledge in an Uncertain World.".
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  18.  92
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World. By Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. (New York: Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. xxi + 251. Price US$60.00.).Ram Neta - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):211-215.
  19.  65
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World, by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath[REVIEW]Trent Dougherty - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1078-1085.
  20.  99
    Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.
    Credal reductivism is the view that outright belief is reducible to degrees of confidence or ‘credence’. The most popular versions of credal reductivism all have the consequence that if you are near-maximally confident that p in a low-stakes situation, then you outright believe p. This paper addresses a recent objection to this consequence—the Correctness Objection— introduced by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath and further developed by Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder. The objection is that near-maximal confidence (...)
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  21. Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne on Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Jeremy Fanti & Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne’s new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potential knower. It argues that the new cases do not provide any new reasons to be concerned about the pragmatic encroacher’s commitment to knowledge-variance. The chapter further argues that concerns about knowledge-variance are (...)
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  22.  93
    Pragmatics without Pragmatism: Reply to Fantl & McGrath.Patrick Rysiew & Trent Dougherty - unknown
    To accept ‘pragmatic encroachment’ is to take the view that whether you are in a position to know is in part a function of practical stakes. This position strikes many as not just unorthodox but extremely implausible. According to Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (F&M), however, the best account of the prima facie oddity of certain utterances incorporates just such a pragmatist maneuver. In reaching this conclusion, F&M begin with Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew’s (D&R’s) theory (...)
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  23. Defending Standards Contextualism.Robert Hudson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 35-59.
    It has become more common recently for epistemologists to advocate the pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, the claim that the appropriateness ofknowledge ascriptions is dependent on the relevant practical circumstances. Advocacy of practicalism in epistemology has come at the expense of contextualism, the view that knowledge ascriptions are independent of pragmatic factors and depend alternatively on distinctively epistemological, semantic factors with the result that knowledge ascriptions express different knowledge properties on different occasions of use. Overall, my goal here is to defend (...)
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  24.  98
    Review of Jeremy Fantl, Matt McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World[REVIEW]Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (5).
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  25. Defeating pragmatic encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7).
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores (...)
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  26. (1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are (...)
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  27. On Intellectualism in Epistemology.Stephen R. Grimm - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):705-733.
    According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — (...)
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  28. Knowledge and epistemic necessity.John Hawthorne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.
    Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl (...)
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  29. Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  30. Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...)
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  31. Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction.Matthew Mandelkern, Jeremy Zehr, Jacopo Romoli & Florian Schwarz - forthcoming - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 27.
    Is the basic mechanism behind presupposition projection fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a basic question for the theory of presupposition, which also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use— language use unfolds in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric— or can they be, at least in part, directly referenced in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim to make progress on (...)
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  32. We’ve discovered that projection across conjunction is asymmetric.Matthew Mandelkern, Jérémy Zehr, Jacopo Romoli & Florian Schwarz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (5):473-514.
    Is the mechanism behind presupposition projection and filtering fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a foundational question for the theory of presupposition which has been at the centre of attention in recent literature :287–316, 2008b. https://doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2008.021, Semant Pragmat 2:1–78, 2009. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.2.3; Rothschild in Semant Pragmat 4:1–43, 2011/2015. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.4.3 a.o.). It also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use ; or are they, at least in (...)
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  33. The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...)
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  34. Modest Infinitism.Jeremy Fantl - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.
    Modest Infinitism -/- Jeremy Fantl -/- Abstract -/- Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes (...)
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  35. Fake News vs. Echo Chambers.Jeremy Fantl - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):645-659.
    I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening our beliefs. I resolve the tension by (...)
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  36. Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity.Jeremy Fantl - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):87-108.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining (...)
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  38. Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  39.  87
    Guidance and mainstream epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2191-2210.
    According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can’t provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, “the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices.” In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this “regulative” critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The (...)
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  40. Ryle’s regress defended.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
  41. What Is It to Be Happy That P?Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    This paper offers a new argument that your reasons for believing or acting need not be true. It proceeds indirectly through an account of what it takes to be happy that p. To be happy that p is for p to be among your reasons for being happy. That’s because questions about why you’re happy and what you’re happy is the case are interchangeable. But, I argue, it is possible to be happy that p even when p is false. In (...)
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  42. What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):834-834.
    In this excellent and well-argued book, Michael Hannon defends two primary claims: first, the function of knowledge-attributions is primarily that of flagging reliable informants; second, proper ep...
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  43. Is metaethics morally neutral?Jeremy Fantl - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  44.  92
    Entitlement and misleading evidence.Jeremy Fantl - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):743-761.
    The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p. Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in-fact irrelevant to that question – (...)
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  45. Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens.Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
    We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.
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  46.  68
    A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters is true if you (...)
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  47. Evidentialism as an Historical Theory.Jeremy Fantl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):778-791.
    According to time-slice epistemology, what attitudes you should have at a time supervenes on features of you—like your evidence or mental states—at that time. Evidentialism is commonly assumed to b...
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  48.  50
    Disingenuous Infallibilism.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):446-460.
    Some recent epistemologists propose that certainty is the norm of action and assertion. This proposal is subject to skeptical worries. If, as is usually supposed, certainty is very hard to come by, legitimate action and assertion will be rare. To remedy this, some have conjoined their certainty-norms with a context-sensitive semantics for ‘certainty’. For a proposition to be certain for you, you only need to be able to exclude relevant alternatives. I argue that, depending on what makes an alternative relevant, (...)
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    Précis of The Limitations of the Open Mind and Replies to Nathan Ballantyne and Miriam Schleifer McCormick.Jeremy Fantl - 2024 - Dialogue 63 (2):309-318.
    In this article, I summarize the main takeaways from The Limitations of the Open Mind and reply to concerns raised by Miriam Schleifer McCormick and Nathan Ballantyne. In reply to McCormick, I emphasize potential difficulties involved in helping people change their minds while representing yourself as taking an “objective stance” toward them. In reply to Ballantyne, I clarify my reasons for thinking that open-mindedness is a matter of being willing to change your mind and that amateurs can in some ways (...)
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  50.  7
    Gambles between obvious truths.Jeremy Fantl - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Counterexamples to knowledge-action links are cases in which, intuitively, you know some proposition but aren’t rational to act accordingly. For example, it’s hard to plausibly deny knowledge of obvious truths like 2 > 1. But when given a choice between betting on 2 > 1 or disjunctions of obvious truths, it seems only rational to bet on the disjunctions, contrary to what knowledge-action links predict. I defend knowledge-action links against this charge. Appearances to the contrary, you should be indifferent between (...)
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